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Teaching Ethics in Context: Wood v. Lucy,
Lady Duff-Gordon in the First
Year Curriculum
Celia R. Taylor*
The opinion in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon' is short,
weighing in at only 822 words, but as a teaching case, those few
words contain multitudes. Of course, any consideration of the
case needs to begin with an examination of the rule of law it
establishes, but the notion that an obligation of good faith
might reasonably be implied in a services contract, and the
ramifications of doing so, can be fairly readily addressed. 2 The
case then can be fruitfully mined for many other topics; for ex-
ample, class discussion could take up any number of "law and"
approaches to legal analysis. By this I mean the case easily
lends itself to considerations of, among others, law and econom-
ics, 3 feminist analysis, 4 and law and social science. 5 But Justice
Benjamin Cardozo's opinion does even more. As is often the
case with a Cardozo opinion, unpacking the stated and unstated
* Professor of Law, Sturm College of Law at the University of Denver. The
author would like to thank Professors Deborah Zalesne, David Nadvorney, Miriam
Cherry and Deborah Post for thoughtful discussion about using Wood v. Lucy,
Lady Duff-Gordon as a teaching vehicle in the first year curriculum. I would also
like to thank Jay Pickard and Blake Callaway for their invaluable assistance.
1. 118 N.E. 214, 222 (N.Y. 1917) (hereinafter "Lady Duff-Gordon") (Although I
suppose technically the case should properly be referred to as "Wood" it is univer-
sally known by some derivation of the Lady Duff-Gordon appellation.).
2. This is not to suggest that the contours of such an obligation are easily
determined. For professors who choose to do so, the discussion of good faith in the
context of Wood v. Lady Duff-Gordon can easily be extended to the broader concep-
tualization of good faith underlying all of contract law. See, e.g., Caroline N.
Brown, Important Contract Concepts: Teaching Good Faith, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J.
1377 passim (2000).
3. Cardozo calls this approach directly into discussion in his opinion (without,
of course, referring to it as a law and economics approach) when he states that
"[w]ithout an implied promise, the transaction cannot have such business 'efficacy
as both parties must have intended that at all events it should have.'" Lady Duff-
Gordon, 118 N.E. at 214-15 (citing The Moorcock, (1889) 14 P.D. 64, 68 (U.K.)
(Bowen, L.J.)). Professor Walter Pratt provides historical and economic perspec-
tive on the case in his article American Contract Law at the Turn of the Century, 39
S.C. L. REV. 415, 420-57 (1988).
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facts, and examining the underlying biases and assumptions of
the decision provides a valuable opportunity to examine criti-
cally the ethics of the behavior of all the participants in the
proceedings.
Some may not agree that it is important to incorporate eth-
ics into a first year contracts course, or any other first year
course for that matter. As Deborah L. Rhode succinctly puts it,
"[tihe conventional view on most faculties has been that educa-
tion in professional responsibility is someone else's responsibil-
ity,"6 a position that could easily be asserted by professors
already straining to include the teaching of substantive law,
critical analysis and the myriad other new disciplines that first
year students must grapple with. In support of not including
discussions of legal ethics in a contracts or other first year
course, professors could point out that most, if not all, law
schools include in their curriculum a course (or courses) dedi-
cated solely to professional responsibility taken by students in
their second or third year. Further, first year students surely
have enough on their plates learning rules and doctrine without
overloading them with discussions about ethics that must, by
their very nature, be ambiguous and unresolvable.
While I acknowledge these points, in my view, it is never
too early to begin to alert students to ethical considerations. To
be clear, when referring to ethics in the context of the first year,
I do not mean ethics in the more narrow sense of the rules or
standards governing the conduct of the members of a profes-
sion, which for lawyers are the substantive rules of professional
responsibility.7 Instead I mean a broader notion of ethics, incor-
4. The seminal work in this area is Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A
Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1065 (1985) (includ-
ing an in-depth discussion of Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon).
5. Gary D. Wexler, Intentional Interference With Contract: Market Efficiency
and Individual Liberty Considerations, 27 CoNN. L. REV. 279, 315 (1994).
6. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31,
31 (1992). See also Richard H. Underwood, Modern Methods in Legal Ethics Theo-
retical and Practical Approaches: What I Think That I Have Learned About Legal
Ethics, 39 IDAHo L. REV. 245, 247-48 (2003) ("I am one of those who believe that it
is best to concentrate on 'the nuts and bolts of the rules of professional conduct'...
rather than attempting to teach 'morality or personal ethics' . . .. ).
7. Of course, the rules of professional responsibility are highly relevant to a
broader discussion of ethics and will certainly factor into first year discussions.
My point here is simply that they are one component of a larger universe-rele-
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porating a consideration of the general nature of morals and the
specific moral choices to be made by an individual. Such choices
are a critical element of many legal decisions, both those re-
flected in judicial opinions and those made by individual law-
yers on a daily basis in the course of their practice.
The centrality of ethics (in the broader sense that I use
herein) to the operation of law makes first year courses an ideal
place to begin having conversations about the role that ethics
can or should play in legal decision making. First year students
need to learn from the outset that the morals and ethics they
bring with them to law school should not be put away in the
process of "becoming a lawyer." The more frequently ethical
concerns confronting lawyers are brought to students' attention
and made a focus of discussion, the better we serve our stu-
dents. Ethical concerns pervade every area of law, and as
professors we are charged with teaching our students to recog-
nize and resolve legal dilemmas8 and to help them gain a deeper
appreciation for ethical standards and professional responsibil-
ity. Calling ethical questions explicitly into issue as early as
possible and in as many law school classes as possible helps stu-
dents understand that even in the hard world of the law, ethics
do matter and are an important factor in each participant's be-
havior. Even early in their first year, law students must grap-
ple with ethical issues underlying doctrinal areas. In a
contracts class, for example, such concerns inform discussions
about estoppel doctrines, reasonability, unconscionability and
countless others. While it is certainly possible to teach these
subjects without explicitly acknowledging the importance of
ethics, discussions will be richer if that role is called into ques-
tion directly. Habituating first year students to be attuned to
ethical concerns has the added bonus of helping to prevent the
marginalization of the rules of professional responsibility that
some professors of upper level courses observe.
Frequent and thoughtful attention to the ethical behavior
of all participants in the legal process helps students appreciate
vant to, but not exhaustive of the ethical (moral) views that first year students
may express.
8. See Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing
the Gap, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO BAR (the "MacCrate
Report").
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the pervasiveness of such concerns, and (one hopes), heightens
student awareness and sensitivity in the area. This heightened
awareness may help keep ethics in the forefront of students'
thinking and remind them that as lawyers they will face ethical
challenges at many times in their careers. As we all know, law-
yers are often perceived by the public as inherently unethical.9
Incorporating discussions of ethics in the first year, and in a
broad variety of courses and settings, habituates students to
consider the ethical ramifications of their actions. 10
Raising ethical considerations early on in the first year
serves another, equally important, purpose. In addition to en-
couraging students to be attuned to ethical concerns, such dis-
cussions show students that it is appropriate to challenge the
cases they are assigned, to get behind the presentation of facts
and the statements of rules of law in order to consider the ethi-
cal (or unethical) behavior of the participants in the process.
Students in general, and first year students in particular, are
far too quick to accept the cases they read as sacrosanct. One of
my greatest pleasures as a professor is when a student dares to
challenge an opinion (even more so when it is authored by as
revered a jurist as Benjamin Cardozo). Because questions
about ethics generally engender debate and disagreement, they
can be valuable in showing students that no one (not even Car-
dozo) is immune from challenge. Challenging opinions helps
students analyze the legal system and to consider the role and
responsibilities of all the participants in that system, a consid-
9. Examples range from the much misquoted, "The first thing we do, let's kill
all the lawyers." (which while an accurate quote from William Shakespeare's King
Henry VI, Part II, looses its intended meaning when taken out of context. WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 4, sc. 2. Spoken by
Dick the butcher, the line expresses his desire to eliminate impediments to a
revolution-recognizing the need to get rid of the lawyers in order to overthrow the
government) to the common view that lawyers contributed greatly to the financial
implosion surrounding Enron, Worldcom and other instances of corporate malfea-
sance. See, e.g., Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal
Ethics, Professionalism and the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV.
859, 955 (2003).
10. See Derek C. Bok, Can Ethics be Taught?, CHANGE 26, 30 (October 1976)
("Although the point is still unproved, it does seem plausible to suppose that the
students in these [ethics] courses will become more alert in perceiving ethical is-
sues, more aware of the reasons underlying moral principles, and more equipped to
reason carefully in applying these principles to concrete cases.").
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eration that should begin in the first year and continue
throughout students' legal careers.
Much more could be said about the utility of teaching ethics
in first year courses generally, and in a contracts course in par-
ticular.1 Because I believe there is at least general agreement
that it is valuable to include discussions of ethics in the first
year curriculum (in addition to teaching professional responsi-
bility in an independent course), rather than continuing to
press that point, I turn to two other issues (1) how should dis-
cussions about ethics be conducted in a first year course and (2)
why is Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon a good vehicle for teach-
ing ethics?
I. How to Talk About Ethics Outside of Professional
Responsibility Courses
I must begin by emphasizing that I am by no means an ex-
pert in teaching ethics, and in fact, do not believe that ethics are
"taught." Rather, I believe that students come to law school
with good powers of ethical judgment. The job of the law profes-
sor is not to try to change those powers or to profess what a
"correct" ethical position is. Instead, the role of the professor is
to impress upon students the ubiquity of ethical considerations
in the law and to help them impose order and discipline on the
ethical sensibilities they already possess.
The following discussion of how to engage fruitfully in ethi-
cal discussion in a first year law school course is simply experi-
ential observations from a long-term first year contracts
professor. Generating valuable discussion about ethics requires
some tact and deftness on the part of the professor. Students
may be reticent in expressing their position on ethical matters
for several reasons. First, depending on at what point in the
course the case engendering the ethical discussion is taught,
students may still be feeling out the atmosphere of the class-
room and may not be comfortable speaking freely. Second, stu-
dents may not think that ethical issues matter, particularly in a
11. For more reasons to include ethics in the first year curriculum, see
DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE
METHOD (1998); Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Teaching Ethics in Evidence,
21 QUINNiVIAc L. REV. 961 (2003).
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first year course when there is (by necessity) often great empha-
sis placed on the doctrinal aspects of cases. Third, even when
ethical issues are central to a decision, students may fear that
their view will be deemed "wrong" or sense that they stake a
minority position and therefore be reluctant to speak freely. It
may not be possible to get every student to a point where he or
she is willing to be forthright on ethical issues (some students
never want to discuss anything, regardless of how non-contro-
versial), but various techniques can be employed to help over-
come this problem.
First, talk about ethics frequently. The more often ethical
concerns are raised in the classroom, the more comfortable stu-
dents get with discussing them. Obviously, not every class can
talk about the ethics of the parties to a case, or the appropriate-
ness of the actions of the lawyers involved, and there will be
many class sessions where ethics are not called into play at all.
However, it does not take much imagination to see ethical is-
sues in many cases, including many classics of the first year
curriculum. 12 When the opportunity is presented, even a short
mention of ethics keeps its relevance in students' minds.
When there is room and opportunity for a more full blown
discussion of ethics, it helps if the professor is explicit about the
nature of the conversation and clearly establishes ground rules
for the class. It never hurts to remind students that from the
moment they walked through the law school doors, they as-
sumed the obligation to act as ethical attorneys-an obligation
that includes listening to and debating diverse points of view
with intelligence and respect. It is also critical that the profes-
sor lives up to this high standard and truly listens to student
input. Discussions of ethics are valuable in that they allow stu-
dents with widely varying backgrounds and experience to con-
tribute, but students will be willing to do so only if they believe
their input will be heard and valued-not necessarily agreed
with, but acknowledged as adding to the dialogue.
12. For example, the standard first year contracts course contains many cases
that raise myriad of ethical issues. Some of these include Allegheny College v. Na-
tional Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown, 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927) (enforce-
ability of charitable subscriptions), Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W. 2d 768
(Tex. App. 1987) (enforceability of "agreements to agree") and ProCD, Inc., v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (timing of offer and acceptance in elec-
tronic contracts).
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It is also important to stress that in many cases, there will
be no "correct" answer. Of course, if a model rule or provision of
the disciplinary code does apply directly to the issue at hand,
the professor must point that out. However, when ethical con-
cerns arise in first year courses, they tend to be in more grey
areas and will not be readily answerable by reference to a rule.
Ethical issues will often cause tension and conflict and prove
difficult to resolve. Student responses will be informed by their
individual experiences, beliefs, intellect and wisdom, and thus
will vary widely. Posing a set of ethical questions as open-en-
ded discussion vehicles gives students an opportunity to appre-
ciate the complexity of these matters and to appreciate that a
wide range of responses is both possible and appropriate.
That said, it is also important to avoid the trap of under-
mining moral value by refusing to impose any judgment on ethi-
cal positions that may be stated by students. A "steady diet of
insoluble dilemmas and regulatory failures . . . can inadver-
tently foster skepticism, relativism, and cynicism. All too often,
an atmosphere meant to reinforce tolerance can end up under-
mining conviction." 13 As professors we must often acknowledge
that some answers are, in fact, "better" than others-in that
they are more reasoned, logical, consistent and coherent. Re-
sponses to questions of ethics can be assessed using similar cri-
teria. It may be difficult to strike a balance between staying
value neutral so as to encourage free and full expression of mul-
tiple ethical stances and devaluing all ethical positions by refus-
ing to deem any one more "correct" than another. However,
that challenge should not prevent us from engaging in the
discussions.
One choice a professor must make for himself is whether to
disclose his own position on a particular ethical issue. There
are good arguments on both sides of the debate, which I need
not re-hash here. I tend to fall on the side of disclosure (per-
haps because it is often too difficult to remain reticent when
lively conversations are going on in the class room). If the pro-
fessor does choose to reveal personal positions, it is critical that
it is done as part of a true discussion and dialogue and not as a
dictatorial statement. Regrettably, regardless of the best pro-
13. See Rhode, supra note 6, at 49.
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fessorial intention, some students will hear any opinion voiced
by a professor as a statement that cannot be challenged. How-
ever, when we as professors strive to encourage full open con-
versations about sensitive matters we should be willing to
participate in those dialogues without holding back.
II. Why Use Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon as a Vehicle
for Teaching Ethics in the First Year
Contracts Course
a. The Background: A Brief Recap of Justice Cardozo's
Opinion in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon
The value of Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon as a case to base a
discussion of ethics may not be immediately apparent. The case
is ubiquitous in contracts casebooks, 14 and needs little review.
In 1915, Otis Wood and Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon entered into an
agreement pursuant to which Wood was to "have the exclusive
right... to place [Duff-Gordon's] indorsement on the designs of
others."'15 This arrangement made good economic sense for each
party. Lady Duff-Gordon, who began her enterprise by making
"personality" dresses-dresses custom designed for each partic-
ular customer16-was an adept businesswoman, capable of
changing with the times. As economic conditions changed, she
expanded her business, moving from custom design to a more
mass-produced approach, "marketing multiple copies of the
same design ... and hiring a manager for her branch office." 17
She also recognized the value of advertising and thus looked for
an arrangement with Wood that would allow her to "concen-
trate on her special skill, designing, while Wood concentrated
on his presumptive specialty, advertising."8 For Wood, the ar-
rangement with Lady Duff-Gordon was beneficial in that it
granted him exclusive access to a customer base with no fear of
competition, a large advantage in the economic climate of the
times.
14. Although I have not conducted a formal investigation into the matter, a
casual perusal of the many contracts casebooks in residence on my office shelves
reveals that each contains the case.
15. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214(N.Y. 1917).
16. See Pratt, supra note 3, at 429.
17. Id. at 430.
18. Id. at 432.
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The arrangement between Wood and Lady Duff-Gordon
proved to be short-lived. In 1916, Lady Duff-Gordon, exhibiting
more of her keen business acumen, entered into a contract with
Sears, Roebuck to have her dresses marketed in Sears' mail or-
der catalog, a move that was championed as "by far the most
spectacular bid for prestige which this daring advertiser [Sears]
has made since it first announced the new handy addition of the
Encyclopedia Britannica."19
Upon learning of this arrangement, Wood sued Lady Duff-
Gordon, claiming breach of contract. In response, Duff-Gordon
argued that because Wood never explicitly promised to take an
action to place Duff-Gordon's endorsements, her agreement
with Wood lacked the mutuality of obligation necessary to cre-
ate an enforceable contract. Wood prevailed at the trial level,
where the judge found that the agreement's requirement that
Wood use his "bona fide judgment" in placing endorsements
placed sufficient obligation on Wood to find mutuality. 20
The appellate court disagreed, finding that because Wood
assumed no explicit duty to place endorsements, the agreement
between the parties lacked mutuality of obligation 2' and there-
fore was unenforceable. 22 Wood did not cede his argument how-
ever, and appealed yet again, this time to the New York Court
of Appeals, where in a four-three opinion, Justice Cardozo ruled
in Wood's favor. The reasons for his so deciding require closer
examination.
The opinion is a classic of Cardozo's writing. After making
several sly characterizations of the defendant,23 Justice Cardozo
19. Id. at 439 (citing Sears-Roebuck's Latest Advertising Coup, PRINTER'S INK,
Sept, 21, 1916, at 28).
20. Id. at 440 (citing Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 6,
1917), reprinted in Papers on Appeal at 13, Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118
N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917)).
21. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 164 N.Y.S. 576, 578 (App. Div. 1917).
Mutuality of obligation at that time was a contract law of long-standing, requiring
that each party to a contract have an obligation under the contract in order for that
contract to be enforceable. See, e.g., WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *445;
JOHN JOSEPH POWELL, ESSAY UPON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS 360
(The Law Book Exchange Ltd. 2005) ("Mutual promises ... must be both made at
the same time, or else they will be both nuda pacta.").
22. Lady Duff-Gordon, 164 N.Y.S. at 578.
23. "The defendant styles herself 'a creator of fashions.' Her favor helps a sale
.t. Ithe things which she designs, fabrics, parasols, and what not, have a new
2008] 257
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admits the essential truth of Lady Duff-Gordon's complaint-
Wood did not explicitly promise to do anything in exchange for
the use of Duff-Gordon's name. "It is true that he [Wood] does
not promise in so many words that he will use reasonable ef-
forts to place [Duff-Gordon's] indorsement and market her de-
signs."24 This causes Cardozo little problem however as he goes
on to state "[w]e think, however, that such a promise is fairly to
be implied."25 Straightforward, non-controversial and allowing
little argument, Cardozo makes the implication of an obligation
of good faith seem both inevitable and uncontroversial.
One senses that Cardozo would have been happy to leave
the matter there, but, to the delight of legal scholars through
the ages, he goes on to justify his conclusion, demonstrating
once again his facility with legal reasoning and the artful use of
facts. As noted by no less a luminary than Karl Llewellyn, Car-
dozo "was a truly great advocate, and the fact that he became a
great judge didn't at all change the fact that he was a great
advocate. And if you will watch.., you arrive at the conclusion
that the case has to come one way." 26 Cardozo manages to con-
vince readers of the seeming unquestionable correctness of his
ruling in the case primarily by reference to economic realities. 27
He cannot imagine that in a business relationship "one party
was to be placed at the mercy of the other."28 He finds support
for this assertion first in the identity of the parties, noting that
"the things [Duff-Gordon] designs .. .have a new value in the
public mind when issued in her name" and that "Otis F. Wood
possesses a business organization adapted to the placing of such
endorsement as the said Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon has
approved." 29
value in the public mind when issued in her name." Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E.
at 90.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Karl Llewellyn, A Lecture on Appellate Advocacy, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 627,
637 (1962).
27. Using economic arguments to justify judicial outcomes was a favorite tac-
tic of Cardozo, amply demonstrated by his rationale in cases such as Jacob &
Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921), and Allegheny College v. Nat'l
Chautauqua Co. Bank, 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927).
28. Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. at 214 (citing Hearn v. Charles A. Stevens &
Bro., 97 N.Y.S. 566, 569 (App. Div. 1906)).
29. Id.
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Cardozo next turns to the language of the agreement be-
tween the parties (a move that warms the hearts of contracts
professors!). He acknowledges that in that agreement, Wood
did not explicitly "promise in so many words that he will use
reasonable efforts to place [Duff-Gordon's] indorsements and
market her designs." 30 Cardozo points out that the agreement
between the parties contained financial terms-specifically,
Lady Duff-Gordon's "sole compensation for the grant of an ex-
clusive agency is to be one-half of all the profits resulting from
[Wood's] efforts."31 Further, Wood promises in the agreement
that he will "account monthly for all moneys received by him,
and that he will take out all such patents and copyrights and
trademarks as may in his judgment be necessary to protect the
rights and articles affected by the agreement."32 Cardozo ac-
knowledges that these may be seen as illusory promises as
nothing in the agreement itself compelled Wood to try to market
anything or to attempt to place Lady Duff-Gordon's endorse-
ment.33 For Cardozo, however, the promise justifies the court in
implying an obligation of good faith, because it supports an in-
terpretation of the agreement that places obligation on Wood. If
Wood did not undertake some effort to market goods and place
Lady Duff-Gordon's endorsement, he stood to gain nothing from
the arrangement, and no one would enter into an agreement
pursuant to which there was nothing to gain. For Cardozo then,
Wood's "promise to pay [Lady Duff-Gordon] one-half of the prof-
its and revenues resulting from the exclusive agency and to
render accounts monthly, was a promise to use reasonable ef-
forts to bring profits and revenues into existence."34
Cardozo's analysis of the relationship of the parties and
their intentions towards each other is ingenious. He seemingly
engages in a formalist approach towards contractual obligation
by not looking beyond the four corners of the document and at-
tempting from the language contained within those four corners
to honor each party's intent. At the same time, however, he
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 215.
33. Id.
34. Id.
20081 259
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supports the "modern judicial propensity" 35 to err on the side of
enforcing agreements by implying the good faith effort commit-
ment on the part of Wood necessary to find consideration and
thus bind the parties' to their word. Also in true Cardozian
form, he supplies information that supports his position, and
omits some that might detract from his argument. For in-
stance, it is worth noting that at the same time that Wood was
negotiating his agreement with Lady Duff-Gordon, he was in
another agreement with Rose O'Neill (the inventor of the
Kewpie doll) that contained an express best efforts clause. 36 In
the context of considering the ethics of Cardozo's opinion, it is
interesting to speculate as to whether he was aware of that con-
tract and chose to ignore it because it weakened his position, or
whether he was in fact, ignorant of its existence.
b. The Subtext: Ethical Issues in Lady Duff-Gordon
1. Overarching Ethical Issues
So what about this simple fact pattern makes the case a
good one to generate ethical discussion? Beginning with the
general (a more specific list of directive questions relating to the
case follows), the case raises an immediate question about the
proper role of judicial action in resolving contractual disputes.
The fact that Cardozo is willing to look beyond the agreement of
the parties and supplement their understanding with addi-
tional terms calls into question the appropriateness of his ac-
tion, and by extension, all "judicial activism." Whether viewed
as paternalism or rational implication based on economic reali-
ties, the fact remains that a judge elected to take action where
no such action necessarily compelled. By implying an obligation
of good faith into the parties' agreement in order to prevent
Wood's promise from being illusory, Cardozo arguably did not
radically alter then current contract law precedent.37 But not
implying such a term would also have been perfectly in keeping
35. Victor P. Goldberg, Desperately Seeking Consideration: The Unfortunate
Impact of U.C.C. Section 2-306 on Contract Interpretation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 103,
109 (2007).
36. Id. at 108.
37. Arthur Linton Corbin, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Contracts, 39
COLUM. L. REV. 56, 56-57 (1939).
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with the doctrine at the time of the case.38 Cardozo had a choice
to make, a choice that required a balancing of equities and out-
comes. Immediately, one's ethical juices start flowing. Under-
standing that the rule of law established in Lady Duff-
Gordon-specifically that parties have an implied obligation of
good faith in carrying out their contractual duties-rests upon a
choice made by the author of the opinion can easily lead to a
discussion about not only the choice made, but the appropriate-
ness of having it be the judge who gets to make it.
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon also presents an excellent
opportunity to consider explicitly the ethical underpinnings of
judicial action more broadly. In addition to raising the issue of
party autonomy versus judicial intervention, the case allows
students to challenge a Cardozo opinion. Even at a fairly early
stage in the first year, most students have encountered Cardozo
and formed strong opinions about his writing. First year stu-
dents often have a difficult time questioning the "correctness" of
an opinion in their casebook, a problem that is only magnified
when that opinion is authored by so revered a justice as Car-
dozo. Encouraging (forcing?) students to challenge the ethics
underlying judicial reasoning regardless of the eminence of the
jurist both aids in the development of critical thinking, and re-
minds students that ethics matter in every legal action.
On that front, numerous ethical concerns can be raised by a
careful consideration of the authorial style and tone of Car-
dozo's opinion. As has been amply demonstrated, 39 it is possible
to view the opinion as sexist in a number of ways. Students
might see Cardozo as belittling Lady Duff-Gordon when he
states that she "styles herself a creator of fashions. '40 Clever
wordplay without doubt, but it could easily be read as implying
that she alone had the belief, or as a reference to days when the
"little women" were responsible for house and home and noth-
38. See, e.g., Northrop v. Hill, 57 N.Y. 351 (1874).
39. See, e.g., Frug, supra note 4; Arthur Austin, The Post Modern Buzz in Law
School Rankings, 27 VT. L. REV. 49, 74-75 (2002); Mark S. Kende, Shattering the
Glass Ceiling: A Legal Theory for Attacking Discrimination Against Woman Part-
ners, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 17, 49 (Nov. 1994); Lenora Ledwon, Storytelling and Con-
tracts: (Casebook Review Essay Contracting Law 2d Ed. By Amy Hilsman Kastely,
Deborah Waire Post, and Sharon Kang Hom. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic
Press, 2000), 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 117, 120 (2001).
40. Wood v. Lucy, Lady-Duff Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917).
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ing further. Such a characterization of Lady Duff-Gordon
grossly misrepresents the magnitude of her accomplishments as
a woman operating a business at the time.41
Conversely, some students might argue that Cardozo por-
trays Lady Duff-Gordon as a heartless money grubber, guilty of
"greedy fickleness" whose "claim that the contract lacked mutu-
ality of assent seems like a technical attempt to dodge responsi-
bility."42 Knowing that Lady Duff-Gordon wanted to conduct
business with Sears Roebuck may heighten this perception. 43
Regardless of where students stand on the spectrum of possible
views of judicial presentment of party identity, the fact that the
spectrum exists creates a rich platform for discussion. Students
can debate about the role and responsibility of the judge in un-
derstanding and portraying the parties in an action before her
and the possibility that judges may manipulate their portrayal
of parties to serve an ultimate objective. Perhaps such manipu-
lation is inevitable? Desirable? Reactions to such inquiries can
spark lively interactions.
In addition to examining the language of Lady Duff-
Gordon, students could be asked to consider the theoretical ap-
proach towards the law favored by Cardozo in the opinion, and
to consider alternatives to it. Cardozo was plain in his belief
that "[e]thical considerations can no more be excluded from the
administration of justice ... than one can exclude the vital air
from his room and live."44 For Cardozo, deciding a case based
on ethical concerns required choosing one social good over an-
other when logical arguments support both positions.45 Deter-
mining the "social good" necessitated consideration of both
41. David McGowan, Judicial Writing and the Ethics of the Judicial Office, 14
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 509, 569 (2001) (advocating that Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon
was "an innovative designer and shrewd businesswoman who supported a hus-
band and family in an era where that was uncommon").
42. Frug, supra note 4, at 1084.
43. Walter F. Pratt, Jr., American Contract Law at the Turn of the Century, 39
S.C. L. REV. 415, 439 (1988) (describing Lady Duff-Gordon's arrangement with
Sears to sell her dresses).
44. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, 66 (Yale Uni-
versity Press 1946) (1921) (quoting JOHN F. DILLON, LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 178 (Little, Brown, and Company 1895) (1894)).
45. Benjamin Andrew Zellermeyer, Benjamin N. Cardozo: A Directive Force In
Legal Science, 69 B.U. L. REV. 213, 219, n.34 (1989) (citing CARDOZO supra note 44,
at 30).
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"public policy, the good of the collective body" and "the stan-
dards of right conduct, which find expression in the mores of the
community." 46 He recognized that the balancing required by
this approach could lead to uncertainty, but was willing to ac-
cept this if the result was a societally preferable outcome than
one based on rigid contractual doctrine. 47 Students could be
asked about what societal values Cardozo is supporting. There
may be great societal value in adherence to "rigid contractual
doctrine"-in fact that rigidity has a long history and has not
vanished entirely from "modern" contract doctrine.48 Clearly,
this conversation will overlap to some degree with the above
mentioned issue of explicit judicial activism, but there are fur-
ther nuances to explore when ethics are so boldly made a basis
of decision.
Those nuances can spark a conversation about whether
ethics should have any role in judicial decision making. If, as is
often asserted, contract law is meant to be amoral, 49 what right
do judges making contract law decisions have to inject ethics
and morality into that process? As with so many questions
about ethics, students may have very different perspectives on
this issue as well.
2. Specific Ethical Questions Raised by Lady
Duff-Gordon
For the reasons discussed above, I believe Lady Duff-
Gordon can fruitfully be used to raise many important ethical
questions in a general and global manner, to the benefit of first
46. CARDOZO supra note 44, at 71-72.
47. Cardozo is explicit about his position in Jacob & Youngs u. Kent, 129 N.E.
889, 891 (N.Y. 1921) ("Those who think more of symmetry and logic in the develop-
ment of legal rules than of practical adaptation to the attainment of a just result
will be troubled by a classification where the lines of distinction are so wavering
and blurred.").
48. See Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983)
(explaining the rise of "new formalism"); Robert E. Scott, Relational Contract The-
ory: Unanswered Questions A Symposium in Honor of Ian R. MacNeil: The Case for
Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 Nw. U.L. REV. 847 (2000).
49. Many of contract law's prominent figures argued for the amorality of con-
tract doctrine. See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L.
REV. 457, 462 (1897). See also ARTHuR L. CORBIN, 5A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 1123, at 7 (1964). Professor Farnsworth also argues in favor of keeping issues of
moral right and wrong out of the law. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON
CONTRACTS, § 12.17a, at 276-77 (1990).
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year students. Before engaging in conversations about the ethi-
cal issues raised by the case, class discussion needs to focus on
the facts and the law established by the opinion. This will
greatly aid any ensuing consideration of ethics because not only
do first year students tend to be unwilling to engage in broader
theoretical discussions if they are still searching for the "hard
law" of the case, but because a careful explication of the facts
will provide the context necessary for meaningful ethical con-
sideration. Once the doctrinal examination of the case is com-
pleted, the professor can pose a wide-ranging series of questions
that are more directive than the general inquires set forth
above. While those general inquires tend to question the ethics
of Cardozo's judicial role, and through those questions the role
of judges more generally, the more specific ethical inquiries
broaden the lens of examination. They are designed to call into
question not just the ethical nature of judicial behavior, but the
ethical behavior of all of the participants in Lady-Duff Gordon,
and by extension, the behavior of parties in each case students
encounter.
The questions that follow are nothing more than a template
of suggested, more specifically focused, questions intended to
highlight ethical concerns. The precise scope and content of
what can be asked is unlimited and will often turn on what
arises in the doctrinal portion of the class discussion of the case.
The questions listed below may not be the "best" ones and are
certainly not the only ones, but they give some sense of the
scope of the ethical issues that underlie the opinion. My intent
by including such a list is simply to give a flavor of the richness
of this case as a vehicle for generating discussions about ethics
in the context of a first year contracts course.
As mentioned earlier, I believe it aids discussions of ethics
if the professor is explicit about the task at hand. Let the stu-
dents know that the following questions are intended to force
them to challenge the seeming ease of Cardozo's opinion, and
perhaps in so doing, to challenge their own notions of both the
case and the roles that all participants in the process play. Stu-
dents may not have enough specific knowledge about the facts
behind the opinion to provide definitive responses (although a
thorough treatment of the factual context of the case will allevi-
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ate this possibility and many casebooks provide illuminating
historical information about the parties involved). 50
The Ethics of the Parties to the Case
The behavior and underlying motivations of both Wood and
Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon are worthy of consideration as each
raises ethical concerns that are common to many contracts
cases.
1. Why would Wood and Lady Duff-Gordon have agreed to
enter into the agreement as it was originally drafted? Do their
intentions at the time of contract execution matter?
2. Was it ethical for Lady Duff-Gordon to argue that the
"agreement" between the parties was not binding? Do you
think her motivations matter?
3. Would it have been (a) ethical, and (b) legally possible,
for Lady Duff-Gordon to seek to enforce the agreement against
Wood if Wood had been the party refusing to honor such
agreement?
4. Was it ethical for Wood to seek to enforce the agreement?
Is there more information you'd like to have before you can an-
swer that question? Do his motivations matter?
The Ethics of the Attorneys for the Parties
Given the way most casebooks are structured, first year
students do not often get an opportunity to consider the actions
of the attorneys involved in reported cases. The questions that
follow require some speculation and allow for some role-playing
as students must imagine what motivations underlie the ac-
tions of the attorneys for each of Wood and Lady Duff-Gordon.
This helps remind first year students that the job they are pre-
paring for comes with its own set of ethics and responsibilities.
Professional responsibility rules will provide answers to some
ethical concerns, but there are many, day to day, situations that
present ethical dilemmas. The more frequently these are
50. See, e.g., CHARLES L. KNAPP, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 432-35 (5th ed. 2003); see also, RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES
AND DOCTRINE 416-23 (3rd ed. 2003); ROBERT E. ScoTT, CONTRACT LAW AND THE-
ORY 347, 359 (3rd ed. 2002).
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drawn to students' attention, the more their importance is
highlighted.
5. If you were Lady Duff-Gordon's attorney and she ap-
proached you for advice about whether she was bound to honor
her agreement with Wood, what advice would you give her?
Does the fact that there was no certainty that an implied obliga-
tion of good faith would be found to exist influence your advice?
6. Given the uncertainty of how a court would rule on the
binding nature of the agreement between Wood and Lady Duff-
Gordon, could the attorney for Lady Duff-Gordon have sug-
gested a different solution that might have avoided the need to
go to court? If such an alternative solution to the dispute be-
tween the parties was available, did the attorney for Lady Duff-
Gordon have an ethical obligation to explain it to her client?
7. If you were Lady Duff-Gordon's attorney and were re-
sponsible for drafting an agreement that would achieve her
goals, how would you proceed?
8. Assume it is possible to draft a legally binding agreement
that essentially gives your client the freedom to withdraw from
that agreement at any time, for any reason and with no penalty
for doing so. Should you draft such an agreement on your cli-
ent's behalf? Is there more information you would like before
making that decision?
9. Assume it is possible to draft a legally binding agreement
that essentially gives your client the freedom to withdraw from
that agreement at any time, for any reason, and with no pen-
alty, but that circumstances do not exist that make you feel
comfortable engaging in that task. What could you/should you
do instead?51 Would your response change if you knew that
ABA Rule of Model Rule of Professional Conduct 2.1 states that:
"In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent
professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering
advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other consider-
51. This question may generate significant student discussion. First year stu-
dents may be very comfortable with the idea that their job is to represent the best
interest of their client, but not so comfortable with the idea that they are entitled
to disagree with what constitutes that best interest, and even to try to convince
their client of the error of their ways. When the ethical stances of lawyer and
client differ, that clash can lead to problematic situations. It seems fruitful to en-
courage students to begin to consider those difficult circumstances while in their
first year.
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ations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that
may be relevant to the client's situation."5 2
The Ethics of the Judge
If a general discussion of the ethical posture of the opinion
was engaged in prior to consideration of these more directive
questions, some of what follows may be repetitive. The profes-
sor may choose to skip those questions that have already been
fully discussed, or may raise the issues presented by them again
on the theory that a little repetition is not necessarily a bad
thing, especially when dealing with first year students.
10. What do you think of the tone of the opinion? Does a
judge have an ethical obligation to remain neutral when writing
opinions? 53 Would "justice" be better served if judges did?
11. Historical research on the case suggests that Justice
Cardozo is somewhat less than fully forthcoming in setting
forth the factual context for his decision. To what extent should
a judge be free to pick and choose among the available facts
when drafting an opinion?
12. Cardozo implies an obligation of good faith into the par-
ties contract, justifying his action by saying "[a] promise may be
lacking, and yet the whole writing may be 'instinct with and
obligation,' imperfectly expressed." Is this a case where an in-
tended obligation between the parties was simply "imperfectly
expressed?" What facts support Cardozo's conclusions about
the parties' intent? Would your answer change if you knew that
at the time Wood entered into his agreement with Lady Duff-
Gordon, he was also a party to a contract that contained an ex-
plicit best efforts clause?
13. Are there reasons that the parties might not have in-
cluded an explicit provision imposing obligations on Wood? If
52. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1.
53. On this point, it is interesting to note that many writers view Cardozo's
opinion as somewhat disparaging towards woman. See, e.g. Frug, supra note 4;
KNAPP, supra note 50. If students concur with this position, it is useful to refer
them to Cardozo's assertion that a judge should stay removed from personal bias
when considering a case. Cardozo believed that a judge's task was to engage in
"free scientific research ... free, since it is ... removed from the action of positive
authority; scientific, at the same time, because it can find its solid foundations only
in the objective elements which science alone is able to reveal to it." CARDOZO,
supra note 44, at 9.
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there are, was it ethical of Cardozo to suppose that the parties
must nevertheless have intended that such a provision be
implied?
14. What ethical considerations was Cardozo promoting in
his opinion? Whose role is it to determine what ethical position
or belief should be given legal sanction?
The Ethics of the Rule of Law Established
As with the ethical underpinnings of the judicial action in
Lady Duff-Gordon, the ethics underlying the rule of law estab-
lished by the case may be fully fleshed out in a general discus-
sion of the opinion. If not, it is worth highlighting the issue by
posing a specific question on the point.
15. In Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, Justice Cardozo
implies a term in order to create the "mutuality of obligation"
typically thought necessary to establish an enforceable contract.
Should mutuality of obligation be a necessary contractual ele-
ment? Could parties willingly enter into an agreement where
only one of them was legally bound? If so, is it proper for a court
to refuse to enforce such an agreement?
16. In Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, Justice Cardozo is
willing to sacrifice some degree of certainty in order to achieve
"fairness." Is "fairness" a higher value for our legal system than
certainty? What are the strengths and/or weaknesses of con-
cluding that our laws should strive to reach a "fair" outcome?
17. It is sometimes said that contract law is or should be
"amoral."54 Do you agree? If so, what consequence does that
decision have on the role that ethics should play in legal deci-
sion making?
18. Implying an obligation of good faith by necessity re-
quires that "courts [will be] much more involved in supervising
the performance of contracts."55 Does that heightened role re-
duce parties' freedom to contract? Is that policing function an
appropriate role for the courts?
54. See, e,g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 73-74, 192-93, 197 (Ox-
ford University Press 1992). See generally DANIEL A. FARBER, ECONOMIC EFFI-
CIENCY AND THE Ex ANTE PERSPECTIVE, IN THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 54, 66-69, 79-80 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D.
Walt eds., 2000) (discussing the intellectual history of law and economics).
55. Pratt, supra note 3, at 443.
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III. Conclusion
For those who believe that ethics in the broad sense of
moral choices and consequences matter a great deal in the law
and lawyering, the first year of law school is an ideal time to
begin to engage students in discussions concerning ethics.
While not ignoring or downplaying the importance of the formal
rules of professional responsibility, first year students can be
shown that the ethical concerns of lawyers are more encompass-
ing than those addressed specifically by those rules.
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon presents an ideal opportu-
nity to challenge first year students to engage in deep consider-
ation of the ethical behavior and stance of all participants in the
case. Justice Cardozo's opinion in the case is like most of his
writings, artful, deliberate and well worth parsing closely.
Most first year students, upon first reading the case, will not
focus on the ethical underpinnings of the decision beyond per-
haps questioning the wisdom of implying an obligation of good
faith and considering what the contours of such an obligation
might look like. While those issues are interesting, and at some
level, central to the decision, they only begin to scratch the sur-
face of the ethical questions raised by the opinion. Directive
questions can help to heighten awareness of the myriad ethical
issues subsumed within Justice Cardozo's elegant language.
Using Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon as a vehicle for in-depth
consideration of ethical concerns serves many purposes. From
the perspective of teaching ethics, it can help first year students
begin to be more critical thinkers and habituate them to seeing
the important role that ethics plays in all aspects of legal deci-
sion making. Inculcating this awareness in the first year will
help law students throughout their legal career and may help
them avoid ethical quagmires of their own down the road.
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